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is  an extensively  revised  version  of  part  of  ny  PhD  thesis  Wynne  (1989).  I  an
grateful  to  my advisor,  Robert  King,  fof  hls  guidance.  I  am also  grateful  to
my colleague  Ewan Koenig  for  his  thoughtful  conments on  this  paper.  The views
expressed  in  this  article  are  those  of  the  author  and  should  noc be  actributed
to  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank of  Dallas  or  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Svsten.1.  Introductlon
Tradltional  discussions  of  the  effects  of  goverrruent  spending  usually
ltuop all  government  purchases  together  in  a  single  ueasure,  r,rhich ls  then
usually  ldentified  wlth  the  series  "coverruoent  Purchases  of  Goods and
Services'r  in  the  national  accounts.  The iurplicit  assuuption  ls  that  all
government  purchases  are  goods or  flnal  output.  In  reallty  of  course  this  is
not  the  case.  Governnents  are  typlcally  large  consuners  of  internediate
products,  in  partlcular  the  servlces  of  factors.  A  significant  proportion  of
the  labor  force  is  usually  employed by  the  goverrment  at  either  the  Federal- or
State  and Local  level.  Ihe  national  accounts  measure of  government
expenditure  l-ncludes  payDents  for  such  services  in  addition  to  purchases  of
non-durable  and durable  (capital)  goods.  Rather  than  }.unp all  of  this
together  under  one heading  it  l--s  i.nteresting  to  ask  how higher  employnent  by
the  government  affects  the  nacroeconorny differently  to,  say,  higher  governnent
purchases of  final  goods.
Of  particular  interest  is  the  question  of  how real  wages respond  to
governuent  purchases,  Changes in  government  purchases,  specifically  nilitary
purchases,  are  cornrnonly  identified  as  a principal  source  of  fluctuations  in
aEgregate  demand.  And the  cyclical  behaviour  of  real  wages is  of  cruciaL
irnportance  in  distingulshing  between  alternative  theories  of  the  business
cycle.  Recently,  Roteuberg  and Woodford  (1989)  hawe argued  that  the  inabiliry
of  perfectly  conpetitive  general  equilibriun  nodels  to  account  for  the
cyclical  behaviour  of  real  waBes warrants  the  shifting  of  attention  to  models
with  ollgopolistic  market structures.  In  this  paper 1will  show that  the  case
against  the  ablllty  of  the  conpecitive  rnodel ao explain  the  cyclical  movenent
in  real  wages ls  not  at  all  robust.  Using  evidence  frorn both  quarterly  andannual  daEa  sets  I  sholr  that  the  conpetitive  model  does  quite  well  !n
accounting  for  the  response  of  real  \rages  to  changes  in  government  purchases,
2.  A statlc  problen
The intuition  of  ho\,r  government purchases  of  final  output  and purchases
of  factor  services  differ  in  their  implicati-ons  for  the  aggregate  economy is
easily  developed  in  the  context  of  a  sinple  static  representatlve  agent
( "Robinson  Crusoe")  economy.  Our  representative  agent  has  access  to  a
production  technology  that  transfornns  effort,  Nt,  into  output  of  final  goods,
Yt .  This  output  is  either  allocated  to  consumpcion, Ct,  or  is  appropriated  by
the  govefrurent,  Gt.  In  addition  Co supplying  effort  to  private  production,
Che representative  agent  may be  forced  to  rrork  a  certain  number of  hours  for
the  gowerrunent,  N[,  so that  total  leisure  time  is  Lt:1-  -  N, -  N:.  The
equilibrit[n  allocations  of  effort  and output  are  given  by  the  solution  to  the
following  equations:
uc  (4,  l-Nr-Nr8) = UN(Ct,1-/Vr-Nts)Fr(Nt)
F(N.) = G.+G.
Figure  1  shows  the  consumption  possibilities  of  the  representative  agen!
in  this  economy.  Initial  equllibriurn,  where  a1l  of  final  goods  output  j.s
consrlmed  privately  and  the  government  denands  no  effort,  is  at  the  point  of
tangency  between  the  consunption  possibility  frontier  and  the  hlghest
attainable  indifference  curve,  at  Eo.  The  implicit  real  wage  is  given  by  the
slope  of  the  llne  l.IW.  At  this  lrage  rate,  a  conpetitive  economy  populated  by  a
large  nurnber  of  identical  firns  and  households  trading  factor  service  andJ
final  output  would  produee  the  same allocation  of  the  flxed  endowment of  tine
betlreen  leisure  and productive  activity,  and have  the  same levels  of  per
capita  output  and consunption  as  the  single  agen!  economy.
Now let  us  see what  happens  if  the  gowernment decides  to  purchase  sone
of  final  goods  output.  The consunption  possibility  frontier  will  shift
parallel  to  icself  vertically  by  the  anount  of  the  goverru0ent purchases  G,  as
illustrated  in  Figure  2a.  At  the  initial  level  of  real  wages there  is  an
excess  demand for  flnal  outpuc.  Ttre relative  price  of  final  output  in  this
ecoDolny ls  simply  the  inverse  of  the  real  lrage.  Excess  dernand  for  final  ouLput
means that  its  relative  price  must  rise  to  restore  equilibrlurn,  i.e.  the  real
wage rnust fall.  The new equilibriutr  is  established  at  a point  such  as  Er.
The real  wage is  lower,  effort  and output  are  higher,  and consu.nption  is
lower.
I,lhat happens  if  instead  of  deuanding  flnal  goods output  Ehe goverrnent
demands labor  services,  the  sole  input  to  private  production  in  this  slrnple
economy?  Thls  is  illustrated  ln  Figure  2b,  The consumption  possibility
frontier  now shifts  parallel  to  itself  horlzontally  by  the  amount of  the
effort  damanded  by  the  government,  N8.  At  Lhe initial  leve1  of  the  real  r{age
there  is  now excess  demand for  labor,  requiring  that  the  real  wage increase.
Equilibrium  is  established  at  a point  such  as  E1  .  Effort  supplied  to  private
production  is  lower,  as  ls  output,  although  total  effort  is  increased  and
consumptLon ls  lower,
Total  government  purchases  of  goods and services  in  this  economy can be
measured as
f.=  Fo(lf. )11.8  + 6.4
To  the  extent  that  government  must  compete  for  labor  services  on  a  competitive
labor  market,  fhis  aggte8ate  is  not  exogenous.  Shocks  to  the  economy  that
cause  the  real  wage  rate  to  vary  (i.e.  shocks  to  the  narBinal  productivi.ty  of
labor)  will  obwiously  cause  this  variable  to  change  even  in  the  absence  of
variatlons  in  the  real  quantlties  of  labor  servlces  or  goods  absorbed  by  the
goverruoenE,  Wlthin  the  context  of  this  model,  there  i-s  no  distinction  between
effort  that  is  drafted  or  conscripted  by  the  government  and  effort  thau  it
demands  through  a  coEpetltlve  labor  narket.
Does  it  matter  whether  the  goverrunent  cuts  lts  purchases  of  final  output
and  increases  its  pulchases  of  factor  services  Lo  produce  the  final  ouEput  it
requires?  T'tre answer  is  no,  as  long  as  the  government  can  operace  the
technology  as  efficiently  as  the  private  sector,  and  the  technology  is  subject
to  constant  returns  to  scale.  There  uay  of  course  be  certain  types  of  output
Ehat  the  government  canno t  purchase  frorn  the  private  sector,  such  as  "national
defense".  In  this  case  the  governueut  only  purchases  factor  services  and  uses
them  to  produce  the  uruleasurable  fina].  output.  The  factor  price  impLications
of  these  purchases  depend  on  the  factor  intensity  of  the  technology  for
:
producing  national  defense:  if  national  defense  is  labor  intensive  relative  to
private  production  activity,  increased  national  defense  purchases  of  factor
services  wlll  raise  real  wages.  The  converse  would  apply  if  national  defense
is  capital  intensive.  It  ls  not  clear  to  rne which  of  the  two  factor  intensity
assumpCions  is  rnore  plausible,  but  these  considerations  do  suggest  a  caveat  to
the  results  in  sectlon  4  be1ow.
3.  An Oligopolistlc  Alternatlve:  Rotemberg and uoodford
In  a  recent  paper,  Rotenberg  and Woodford  (1989)  have  argued  that  one of
the  shortconinBs  of  the  competitive  rnodel is  its  inabilicy  to  explain  thef,
resPonse  of  the  real  wage  to  aggregate  demand  shocks.  T'lxe competitlve  model
explains  varLations  in  enplo)ment  that  come  about  in  response  to  denand  shocks
as  reflecting  changes  in  the  wtlltngness  of  households  to  supply  labor.  None
of  the  variatlon  is  due  to  changes  in  the  demand  for  labor.2  They  argue  that
the  procyclical  behaviour  of  real  wages  and  evidence  that  business
fluctuations  are  accompanled  by  large  changes  in  labor  demand are  incornpatible
with  thls  aspect  of  the  competitive  model.  In  its  stead  they  propose  an
oligopolistic  rnodel  where  firms  collude  to  keep  prices  above  marginal  cost.
For  the  collusiwe  equilibrium  to  be  sustainable  as  an  equilibrium  in  the  face
of  exogenous  increases  ln  aggregate  demand  it  is  necessary  that  Lhe
equilibrium  narkup  faLL  at  such  times,  thereby  inducing  an  increase  in  rhe
demand  for  labor.  For  plausible  parameterisations  of  their  nodel  they  predict
that  the  real  wage  should  increase  in  response  to  innovations  in  uilitary
purchases,  which  they  take  as  Ueing  the  najor  source  of  exogenous  shocks  to
aggregate  denand.  They  also  report  evidence  from  sirnple  bivariate  vector
autoregressions  co  support  this  hypothesis.
The  analysls  of  this  paper  suggests  that  real  wage  effects  of  changes  in
nilitary  purchases  are  different  depend.ing  on  whether  the  purchases  are  of
goods  or  services.  Increased  purchases  of  goods  depress  the  real  wage,
increase  purchases  of  factor  services  raise  it.  In  their  ernpirical  work
Roternberg  and  Woodford  do  not  distinguish  between  the  tr,ro.  And  since  their
criticism  of  the  conpetitive  model  hinges  on  the  response  of  the  reaL  wage  to
changes  in  nilitary  purchases,  it  is  inportant  to  ask  how  robust  their
findings  are  to  deconposltLon  of  rnilitary  purchases  along  the  lines  of  goods
2 Thls  ls  cLeally  true  of  slnple  conpetltlve  rnodels of  the  sort  outlined
ln  thls  paper:  lt  nould  not  be  true  In  a  conpetitlve  nodel  where,  for  exanple,
government  purchases  enhanced the  productivlty  of  prlvate  factors  of
productLon.  See Aschauer (1989).b
and  services.  RotenberB  and Woodford  look  at  quarterly  data  and so  are
confined  to  an  examinatlon  of  the  post  WWII period.  If  I,re  use  annual  data  we
can  include  WI.III  ,  the  biBgest  tenporary  Lncfease  in  nilitary  purchases  of  both
goods and  servlces  this  country  has  seen.
4,  Results
The empirical  work  reporced  in  chis  section  uses  both  quarterly  and
annual  data.  The reason  for  this  is  that  use  of  annual  data  allorrs  us  to
include  World  War II  in  the  sample:  most  quarterly  time  series  only  start  in
1947  .  The data  appendix  gives  the  sources  and definitlons  of  all  variables.
The theory  outlined  in  section  2  above  implicitly  assumes that  final  output
and  effort  absorbed  by  the  goverrment  does not  in  any way enhance the
Productivity  of  the  private  producLlon  technology.  Aschauer  (1.989) has  shorrn
that  this  ls  not  true  for  alL  categorie"  of  goverrunent purchases.  He shovrs
that  the  stock  of  nonmilitary  public  capital  does  indeed  enhance the
productlvicy  of  private  factors  of  productlon.  He is  unabLe  to  find  any
relati-onship  betlreen  the  stock  of  rnilitary  capital,  or  any military  variable
for  that  natter,  and the  productivity  of  private  capital,  and  it  is  this
finding,  along  with  connon sense,  that  motivates  rny focusing  on military
purchases  of  final  outpur  and effort.
A1l  of  the  empirical  work  srarted  Lrith  OLS esrimation  of  the  followine
over-parane Eerized  node] :
Anr=  co+ !  c,,rAw.-.+ E  or,rAg.-r* Eo.,rAn|_r*  f  co,.AUR._.+  ardumlj+ e.
i.1  t.0  !=0  i=0
where w.  is  a measure of  the  real  wage rate,  gt  !s  a measure of  government
purchases  of  final  output,  ns  ls  a measure of  governnent  purchases  of  laborI
services,  IIR is  the  civillan  unenployment  rate  and DUMT  3  is  a  durnrny  variable
that  is  equal  to  1-  up  to  1973 and 0  thereafter.  The inclusl-on  of  the  l-973
dunmy was motivated  by  a  an  initial  exanination  of  the  real  wage series  whlch
rewealed  clear  signs  of  a  change in  the  underlylng  growth  rate  in  or  around
L973,  Estination  was carried  out  ln  first  differences  as all  of  the  series
seeued to  be  integrated  of  at  least  order  l.
Ttte results  from  the  postwar  quarterly  sample  are  reported  in  Table  ].
The strategy  followed  in  arriving  aE these  specifications  was to  set  k-1:n:n-5
initially  and  estinate  (4).  lnessential  variables  and  lags  \rere  then  deleted
in  repeated  rounds  of  re.-estioation  until  the  final  forms  reported  in  tbe
table  were  obtained.3  The criterion  used  to  deternine  whether  a variable
should be retained  was that  the  absolute  value  of  its  t-statistic  exceed 2.
The roodels thus  arrived  at  were  then  subjected  to  a variety  of  speciflcation
tests  and out  of  sanple  forecasting  to  ensure  that  they  \^rere  adequate
reptesentations  of  the  data.  Some  of  these  tests  are  reported  in  Table  1,  and
are  explained  rnore fully  in  the  notes  to  the  table.
Equation  (1)  relates  ttre  growth  in  real  wages in  manufacturing  to  growth
in  real  military  purchases  of  goods  (g1  ),  real  compensation  of  ernployees in
the  xnilitary  (n!)  ana  the  change in  the  1og of  the  unernplo)nnent  rate.  The
coefficient  estimates  on  Ag.  and  anf  are  both  significant  at  the  5t  Level  have
the  signs  predicted  by  our  theory,  The coeffieienC  estimates  on the
unenplo)ment  rate  variables  are  nearly  equal  and opposite  in  sign,  suggesling
that  it  might  be  nore  appropriate  to  include  the  variables  in  second
difference  form.  Equation  (2)  reports  the  results  lrhen we do  this.  The
3Ttre strategy  of  lrorklng  from
the  most  parslmonlous  verslon  that
by Hendry and Rlchard(1982),
over-paraneteriz  ed nodels  such  as  (4)  to
ls  compatlble  t'lth  the  data  ls  reconmended6
coefficient  estimates  on  As,  and  Anr
i  change  lietle  ln  absoLute  magnitude,  and
retain  both  their  sign  and  signlflcance.  The  robustness  of  the  findings  in
equation  (1)  can  also  be  checked  by  re-estiuating  the  relationship  in  second
differences.  These  results  are  reported  in  equation  (3).  Both  of  the
government  varlables  continue  to  have  the  signs  pfedicted  by  the  theory,  and
Iags  of  each  are  retained  ln  the  preferred  model.
Equation  (4)  reports  the  simplified  model  derived  fron  (12)  when  Anf  ls
replaced  by  anl ,  a measure of  the  number of  bodies  on nilitary  payrolls  rather
than  military  eonpensation.4  The variable  Afr? does not  appear  in  the  final
form  because  none of  its  coefficients  rrere  significant.  However the
coeffi-cient  on Ag1 in  the  flnal  form  does have  the  correct  sign  and  is
significant.  The  variable  Aif  is  not  signiflcant  when  AUR is  raplaced  by
A2UR,  as  ln  equation  (5),  nor  when  the  model  is  re-estimated  ln  second
differences,  as  in  equation  (6).  In  both  cases  however,  the  coefficient
estinates  on  Ag1  and  A2  91  ate  negative,  as  predicted  by  our  theory.
Finally  equations  (6)-(9)  reporr  OLS estimates  of  the  relationship
betneen  the  real  uage  in  manufacturing,  the  share  of  defense  purchases  of
final  output  ln  GNP (g2)  and  the  size  of  rhe  military  relarive  ro  roral
enployment  (n!  ).  In  no  case  are  the  coefficients  estimates  on  n!
slgnificant,  so  it  does  noc  appear  in  any  of  the  final  forms.  Buc  once  again
{It  ls  not  lllllledlately  obvlous  chat  fri  Ls  a better  ernpirlcal  neasure  of
the  theoretl.cal  varlable  Nc than  n:.  Both  serles  have  thelr  nerlts.  The
advantage  of  fri  ts  of  course  that  it  ts  a  physlcal  quantlty,  the  number of
productlv€  rrorkers  absorbed  by  the  mllltary.  Tte  advantage  of  n!  is  that  it
allows  for  workers  of  dlfferent  productlvlties  being  absorbed  by  the  military
by  selghtlng  each worker  by  hls  real  wage.I
the  coefficient  estimates  on  g2  are  signiflcantly  negative.
How robust  are  the  results  reported  in  Table  1?  Along  with  each
regressLon  I  also  report  a  nurnber  of  test  statistlcs  that  suggest  that  in  each
case  the  nodels  are  remarkably  free  frou  najor  speclfication  error.  This  !s
all  the  more  remarkable  given  the  parsiroonious  specificatlon  of  the  equatlons.
The  reported  test  sEatlstics  do  not  however  address  the  potential  endoBeneity
of  soue  of  the  regressors.  Ihere  ls  good  reason  to  beliewe  that  in  a
con0petltive  econony  Ehe  real  compensatlon  of  the  nilitary  wt:ll  bear  some
relationship  to  the  average  level  of  real-  wages  i.n  the  rest  of  the  econooy
(here  proxied  by  the  real  wage  in  nanufacturing).  There  is  also  good  reason
to  believe  that  there  ls  sorne relationship  between  the  unernployrnent  rate  and
real  wages.  Exogeneity  of  Anl  and  AUR in  equation  (l)  was  tested  using  a
Hausrnan-type  specification  test,  with  lags  of  Anl  and  AUR used  as  instruments.
The  results  of  these  tests  r^tere anbl8uous,  apparently  because  the  lagged
values  of  these  variables  perform  poorly  as  instrueents.
Despite  the  amblguous  outcone  of  this  test  it  was  decided  to  to  ahead
and  re-estimate  some of  the  equations  ln  Table  (1)  using  instrumental
variables.  Table  2  reports  the  results  of  doing  chis.  The  most  obvious
consequence  of  replaclng  OLS \rith  IV  estination  ls  to  cause  a  loss  of
statistical  significance  on  all  of  the  coefficient  estinates.  As  the  sinpLe
test  stalistic  reported  wlth  each  regression  indicates,  we are  unable  to
reject  the  nulI  hypothesis  that  all  of  the  IV  coefficient  esrimates  are
jointly  equal  to  zero.  More  specificafly,  An!  is  no  longer  significant  in
exPlalning  movements  in  real  trages,  as  equations  (1-')  and  (2')  indicate.
Encouraglngly,  the  sign  of  the  coefficient  estimate  on  this  variable  is  still
consistenE  lrith  the  predictions  of  our  theory.  The  coeffici.ent  estimates  on
the  measures  of  governnent  purchases  of  final  output,  Ag1  and  Ag2,  generally10
retain  their  sign  and  signiflcanee.  FinaIIy,  note  that  we are  unable  to
teject  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  lnstruments  are  orthogonal  to  the  error
term uslng  Sargan's(1964)  test  for  the  validity  of  insLnmenrs.
Table  3 reports  the  results  of  estimating  a model  slmtlar  to  (12)  using
annual  data.  Except  fof  the  unenployrnent rate,  variable  definitions  differ
slightly  from  those  used  in  the  quarterly  estination.  The real  lrage measure
(w.)  ls  now a measure of  real  wage lu  total  private  industry  rather  than
manufacturing  industry.  The deflator  used  to  convert  noninal  nages  to  reaL
wages is  the  fixed  weight  deflator  for  personal  consunption  expenditures  fron
the  national  accounts.  .The real  neasure  of  productive  resources  absorbed  by
the  milltary  1n1,.)  i.s defined  as wage and salary  pa)rueuts  to  the  rnilicary
deflated  by  the  irnplicit  price  deflator  for  federal  Eoverflment purchases.
Purchases  of  final  output  (g1,.)  are  total  defense  purchases  of  goods and
services,  deflated  by  the  implicit  price  deflator  for  federal  goverrunent
purchases,  less  the  wage and salary  component.  Flually,  the  nunbers  on
military  payrolls  (ni,r)  is  defined  as  rhe  number of  full  rime  equivalenr
enployees on milltary  payrolls.
Both  OLS and  IV  estirDates  are  reported  in  the  table.  As with  the
quarterly  estimaces,  the  signs  on  the  nilitary  variables  in  the  wage equations
are  consistent  with  the  predictions  of  the  simple  competitLve  nodel.  IV
estimation,  using  lags  of  A2UR  and Anl  or  Ani  as  the  case  may be,  as
instruments  results  in  some  loss  of  staeistical  significance,  but  the  general
thrust  of  the  tesults  remains  the  sane.  Experinentation  r,rith  the  sanple  size
reveals  that  the  inclusion  of  the  war  years  (1940-1947)  in  rhe  sample  is
crucial  to  obtaining  statistically  significant  results  for  the  military
variables  lrith  the  annual  data.  This  is  hardly  surprising  as  the  annual
variation  in  these  series  is  quite  small  in  the  post-war  period.  A1I  of  theannual  serles  can be  extended  back  to  1929,  to  incorporate  the  Depression
years.  Not  surprisingly,  the  estlnated  relatl-onships  are  not  stable  when the
sauple  is  extended  ln  this  na  rer,  although  as  the  {r  statistics  reported  with
each uodel  show,  the  relatlonships  are  stable  when lhe  sarnple ls  extended. to
include  the  1980's  -
5.  concluslons
This  paper  has  addressed  the  quescion  of  how real  wage rates  respond  to
changes  in  goverruent  purchases  of  final  output  and  factor  services.  For  the
category  of  governrnent purchases  that  is  least  llkely  to  have  any  feedback  to
Private  tastes  or  technology,  namely nilitary  purchases,  I  have  shown that  the
response  of  real  wages depends crucially  on r,rhether the  goverrunent
appropriates  finar  output  or  factor  (labor)  services.  Quarterly  data  fron  the
Postwar  period  show that  tshe finding  that  real  wages decl-ine  in  response  to
increased  milltary  purchases  of  final  output  is  robus!,  but  that  the  increase
iu  real  wages in  response  to  increased  military  appropriation  of  factor
services  is  less  so.  The failute  to  flnd  increases  in  real  wages in  response
to  increases  in  the  size  of  the  military  in  the  postrrar  period  can,  I  think,
be  attributed  ro  tlro  things:  first,  rhe  difficulty  in  obtaining  good
instrunental  varlables  for  real  compensation  of  employees  1n the  rnilitary,
and,  secondly,  the  relatlvely  small  variation  in  the  neasure  of  the  size  of
the  armed forces  during  this  period.  l,Ihen  we look  ac  annual  data  and  include
World  l,lar II  in  the  sample,  'e  again  flnd  that  the  response  of  real  lrages  to
changes ln  differenc  categories  of  military  purchases is  consistent  vi.ch our
Eheory.  With  the  annual  data,  the  finding  tha!  real  wages increase  in
response  to  increases  in  the  slze  of  the  military  is  more robust,  althoughLL
critically  dependent  on  the  inclusion  of  lJorld  War  II  ln  the  sample.
It  is  not  Just  real  wages that  respond  differently  to  changes  in
dlfferent  categories  of  governnent  purchases.  In  a  cornpanlon paper  (I{1.nne
(1990))  I  hawe examined  the  response  of  real  lnterest  rates  to  changes  in
purchases  of  goods and  services,  with  partlcular  reference  to  the  abillty  of
the  draft  to  explain  the  betraviour  of  real  inLerest  rates  during  wartime.  I
find  that  dlsaggregation  of  government  purchases  may be  a nore  useful  way to
think  about  this  question  than  sorne  of  Ehe alternatives,  such  as  the
inttoduction  of  consumer durables.L3
Appendlx:  Dynamlc  Extens Lon
TtIe extension  of  this  analysls  to  a  d1manlc  framework  is  easily
accomplished  by  the  addltlon  of  physlcal  capital,  lQ,  as  an additional  facror
of  production  and  the  speclfication  of  an accunulation  equation  for  this
capital,  The equllibrlurn  of  the  dynarnic econony  is  given  by  the  solution  to
the  following  planning  probleu.  Households  maximize  a  tlne  sepalable  utility
function  over  an  infinite  horizon.  Utilicy  ac  sacb  poinc  in  time  depends on
consumption  C.  and  leisure  L.,  bottr  of  which  are  assurned to  be  nornal  goods.
They also  have  an  endolrment of  one unit  of  time  each period  which  ls  divided
betr,reen leisure  and efforc.  Total  effort  j.s  divided  becween working  for
private  firns  and working  for  the  goverrulent.  Thls  probl-em can be  formally
stated  as
nax t  ptu(c., 1-,v,-rv,8)
c,,tt.  g-_o
subj ect  to
F(4  ,  ivt  ) +(  l-6 )4=Ct+(t.r  +Gt
Ko=Xo,
where  Ro  denotes  the  initial  endowment  of  productive  capital.
The  solution  to  this  problern  is  given  by  the  first  order  conditions
DrU ( d.  , 1 -N. -l'/.8 ) =1.
DlU(C., 1  -4 -Nts)  =IED2F({, Ni)and  the  transversalitv
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Fl.-t  [ (1--6)  +D.F(Kt,r,Nt-1) ] =rr
F(K.  ,  iv. ) +  ( I -6 ) Iq =ct +J(t.l+Gr
condition
liu  BtI.X..t=O.
Total  governrnent purchases  are  now glven  by
t.=  Fn(K., N.)iV.8  +G.
It  is  readily  seen  that  the  model  reduces  to  a  system  of  nonliuear
difference  equations.  Since  closed  foru  solutions  to  this  model  can  only  be
found  in  special  cases,  detailed  analysis  of  the  model  can  only  be  carrled  out
by  numerical  rnethods.  What  is  relevant  for  our  current  purposes  is  whether
the  predictions  of  the  simple  static  rnodel  outlined  in  rhe  text  are  changed
when  we  move  to  a  dynarnic  setting.  Fortunately  this  question  can  be  answered
without  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  rnodel.  As  long  as  the  production
technology  F(.)  exhibits  constant  returns  to  scale,  real  factor  re'ards  in  the
steady  state  equilibrium  of  this  nodel  are  determined  solely  by  lhe  parameters
of  tastes  and  technology  and  are  invariant  to  the  arnounc of  final  output  or
labor  appropriated  by  the  tovernment.t)
Data  Appendlx
Ouarterlv
All  of  the  quartetly  data  lras  raken  fron  CITIBASE.  CITIBASE variable
names are  included  in  brackets  after  each  series.
1,  ReaI  wage  (w.)  deflned  as  the  ratLo  of  Gross  Average  Hourly  Earnlngs
of  Production  or  Nonsupervisory  Workers  in  Manufacturing  Industry  (LEHM) to
the  Consuuer  Price  Index  for  Wage  Earners  and Clerical  llorkers  (  PRNEIJ)  .
2.  Uilitary  purchases  of  final  output  (g1  )  defined  as  National  Defense
Purchases  of  Goods and Servi-ces  (GGFEN)  less  Compensation of  Ernployees in
National  Defense(cclNc),  divided  by  the  Inplicit  price  Deflaror  for  National
Defense  Purchases(GDGFEN)  .
3,  The share  of  nilitary  purchases  of  final  oucpur  in  cNP (g2)  defined
as  the  ratlo  of  National  Defense Purchases of  Goods and Services(GGFEN)  less
Compensation  of  Employees  in  Narional  Defense(GGFNC)  to  Nominal CNp(cNp).
4.  Efforr  absorbed  by  rhe  nilitary  (ni)  defined  as  rhe  ratio  of
Cornpensation of  Employees ln  National  Defense(GGFNC)  to  the  Implicit  price
Deflator  for  National  Defense  Putchases(GDGFEN).
5.  Mllltary  payrolLs  (nf)  defined  as  Residenr  Armed Forces  iu  the  United
S  tates  (PoAR)  .
6.  Si_ze  of  the  nilitary  relative  to  total  enploymenr (n!)  defined  as the
ratio  of  Resident  Anned Forces  in  the  United  States(POAR)  to  Workers  on
Nonagricultural  Payrolls  in  Total  Private  Industry(LP).
7.  Unemployrnent  (UR) defined  as rhe Civilian  Jobless  Rate(LHUR).
Annual
For  the  period  1947-1990 a1l  annual data  are  frorn CITIBASE.  prior  to1947 data  are  from
States.  L9  2  9-1982
l-6
The National  Income and Product  Accounts  of  the  United
and Historical  Statistlcs  of  the  United  States:  Colonial
ratio  of  Wage and
Price  Deflator  for
Time  equivalent
Tloes  to  1970.
1.  ReaI  wage defined  as  the  ratio  of  lJages and Salaries  per  FuII  Tine
Equivalent  Ernployee in  Prlwate  Industry  (source:  National  lncorne and Product
Accourrts  (NIPA)  Table  6.8A,8)  to  the  Fixed  Weight  Price  Index  for  Personal
Consutrption Expenditures  (source:  NIpA Table  7.9).
2.  Ml1ltary  purchases  of  final  output  defined  as  National  Defense
Purchases of  Goods and Services (  source  : NIPA Table  3.2;  prior  to  1939 data  are
frorn  Table  A-1  of  Kendrick(1961))  less  llage  and  Salary  PaynenLs in  the
Mll itary  (  source:  NIPA Table  5.54,8),  deflared  by  rhe  Impl,icir  price  Deflator
for  Federal  coverrurent  Purchases(source:  NIPA Table  7.4)
3.  Effort  absorbed  by  rhe  uilirary  defined  as  che
Salary  Paynrents !n  the  Military  divided  by  rhe  Implicit
Federal  Government Purchases.
4.  Military  payrolls  defined  as  the  number of  Full
Ernpl.oyees  in  the  MiI itary  (  source  :  NIPA Table  5.74,8).
5.  UnenployrnenL (UR)  ls  series  LHUR  frorn  CITIBASE





(f)  Aw. -  9.60t  -  0.044Ag1,t  +
(0.001)  (0.01s)
0.066auRt +  0.050auRt_1
(0.0r3) (0  .0r3)
T :  L96I:2  -  1,985:4  R2
er(20,94) -  r.66  €2(5,89)
-  0.3s3  DI,I  -  1.661




o.  lo9Anf  -
(0.027  ) 
-'-
Estimates
€4&,86) :  r.29
(2)  Aw. -  -0.005x1-0-2 -  0.031Ag1,. +
(0.001)  (0.016  )
-  0.057a2uRr  +  0.  o03DUM73
(0.01-2)  (0.001)
T -  I96Lt2 -  1985:4  R2  :  0.370
€r(20,94) -  L.26  €2(s,89) :1.30
o  .  LloAnf r
(0.025) 
-'-
DW  -  1.529
€3  (7,86) -  1.  80 €4  (4,86)  -  l-.49
(3) A2w"  -  -1.52t*to-o  -  0.685A2w._,
(0.001)  (0.082)




+  0.095A2nf  .
(0.024)
+  0.088A2n!..-.  +  0.065A2nf  ._"  -  0.045a2uR.
(0.028)  (0.025) 
--- 
(0.013)
T -  1951:3  -  L985:4  R2  -  0.558  Dw  :  2.090
{1  (20,89)  -  1.26  €2(s,84)  :0.79  *(16,72)  -  0.96
(4)  Aw. -  1..912x1-0-a  -  0.032ag1,r
(  0.  001)  (  0.  017  )
-  0.045AURI-1 +  0.003DUM73
(0.013)  (0.001)
T -  1960:3 -  1985:4  R2  :  0.270
{r(20,97)  -  1.09  €2(5,92)  -  L.12
0 . 06  6auRt
(0.013)
€4(4,8r-):0.2s
DW  -  1.666
(3  (7,89) -  0.84 €(4,8e) :  L.36Table  1  (Continued)
Quarterly  Data:  OLS Escinates
(5)  Aw. -  -0.364x10-a  -  0.027a81,t  -  0.056A2UR. +  0.003DUM73
(0.001)  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.00r-)
T -  1960:3 -  1985:4  R2  -  0.246  DW  :  1.590
el  (20,98) -  1-.01  {2(5,93) -  2.17  €3(s,92) -  0.ss  €.(4,90)  :1-.33
(6)  A2w. -  I .074x1,0-a -  0.  651A2w.-1 -  0. 356A2w.-2
(0.001)  (0.084)  (0.080)
-  0.038A2  91,.  -  O.34L?gr,r-:,  -  O.519A2URt
(0.016)  (0.016)  (0.013)
T -  1-960:4  -  1985:4  R2  :  0.468  DW  -  2.121
{1  (20,95) -  1.02  €2(5,90):1.14  €3(10,84):1.30  €4G,87):2.25
(7)  A..  -  -0.197x10-a  -  0.809Ag2,. -  O.O53AURt
(0.001-)  (0.442)  (0.013)
+  0.045auRt-1  +  0.003DUM73
(0.013  )  (0.001)
T -  1960:4 -  1990:4  R2  :  0.269  DW  -  1.554
(1  (20,96) -  1.06  €2  (5,9r)  :  1.64  {3  (7,  e8) :  0.78  ({  (4,88) :  1.3s
(8)  Aw. -  -L.77 ZxLQ-a -  0.779\g2.t  -  0.O53A2uRi +  0.003DUM73
(0.001)  (0.442)  (0.012)  (0.00L)
T -  L960:3 -  1985:4  R2  :  0.249  Dt^I  -  1".594
f1  (20,98):  r,.00  €2(5,93) :2.02  {3(5,92) :0.38  €4(4,90) :1.3622
Table  1  (Continued)
Quarterly  Data:  OLS Estlnates
(9)  A2w.  -  -L.299x10-a
(0.001)
-  O  .733A2  g2,.
(0.386)
T-1960:2-1-985:4
(1  (20,98) -  0.  86




R2  -  0.500
€2  (5,93) -  0.  92
O  .37  Lazw.-,
(0.079)
DW  :  2.Q76
€3  (8,89) -  0.9r-
heteroskedasticicy,  formed by
the  original  regression  and their
ARCH,  forrned by  regressing  the
the  first  through  nth  lags  of  the
joint  significance.
€4  (4,90) -  3.00
Notes  to  Table  I
(1)  Scandard  errors  are  in  parenthesis.
(2)  {1 (N,r)  ls  an  F-cest  for  parameter  constancy  when  the  sample  used  to
estlmate  the  model  is  extended  by  N  observations.
€z(K,.)  is  the  F-form  of  Godfreys  test  for  autocorrelacion  frou  lags
through  K,
€:(.,.)  is  the  F-forn  of  a  test  for
regressing  the  squared  residuals  on
sguares.
€t(n,.)  ls  the  F-form  of  a test  for
squared  residuals  on  a  consEarrt  and
squared  residuals  and  testing  their23
Table  2
Quarterly  Data:  Mstimates
(1')  Aw. -  0.002  -  0.054Ag...  +  0.015Ar\8  _
(0.001-)  (0.021)  (0.1s1)'
-  0,169auRr  +  0.107AItRt_1
(0.0s4)  (0.034)
x2$)/5  for  !p  -  o  :  3.85
(2')  Aw.  :  -0.00007 -  O.O3l-Agr.!  +  0.l42Anf.
(0.001)  (0.017)  (0.100) 
- -
-  0.031a2uq  +  0.003DUM73
(o.o27)  (0.001)
x215)/5 for  firu  -  o  : 4.63
(4')  Aw.  -  0.00056 -  0.042A;1,r -  0.149auRt
(0.001)  (  0.02  t-)  (0.064)
+  0.0097AUR{_1  +  0.003DUM73
(0.042)  (0.002)
xz  $)/s  for  firy  -  o  :  3.70
(5')  Aw.  -  -0.00007 -  0.023ag1r  +  0.013a2uRt  +  0.003DUM73
(0.001)  (0.019)  (0.04s)  (0.001)
X-(4)/4foxflay-0:3.35
(7')  Aw. -  0.00019  -  0.686Ag2,. -  0.  L54AURt
(0.001)  (0.546)  (0.072)
+  0. 103AURt_1  +  0.002DUM73
(0.047)  (0.002  )
x2  G)/5  fot  firu  :  o : 3.6124
Table  2  (Continued)
Quarterly  Dala:  Mstlmates
(8')  Aw. -  -0.00012  -  0.903Ag2,. +  0.005AURt +  0.003DUM73
(0.001)  (0.  s00)  (0.043)  (0.00L)
xz(q/4  for  !ry  -  o  :  3.95
Notes  Lo Table  2
(1)  Standard  errors  in  parenthesis.




(r) Aq  -  -0.0164e' .
(0.007)
T:1-940-1980
€1  (9,37) -  0.99
(1')  Awt  -  -0.025A91,r
(0.012)
r-1940-1980
(2)  Aw. -  -0.034Agr,.
(0.010)
T -  1940-1980
{1  (9,  37) -  1.20
+  0.067Anf  .
(0.010)  '
R2  -  0.911
E2(2,35)  -  2.53
+  0.O8oAnf  -  -
(0.016  ) 
-"
y' q+s  I 1+1  n,  fir,
+  o.  o88^fri  ,
(0.0r4)  -'-
R2  -  0.906
€2<2  ,35) :  L.24
-  0.0t8a2uRf +
(0  .004)
Dr.r  -  1.640
€3  (l ,28) -  O.26
0.021A2uR{  +
(0,014)
-  0 : 85.17
-  0.020a2uRt  +
(0.005)
DW  :  l-.826
€3  (7,28) :  0.9r-









€4  (1,35) -  L6  .37
(2') Aru.  -  -0.0694gr,.
(0.026)
T -  1940-1980  X
n  1  17  ^;B
(0.034)'
:  {4)  /4  for
0.03542u& +
(0.020)
-  0 : 55.66 PIY
Notes  to  Table  3
(f)  Standard errors  in  parenthesi.s.
(2)  See notes  to  Tables  1 and 2 for  explanation  of  the  varlous  test
statistics.zo
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